category?' 3 Robert Stevens admitted his views on tort law were 'conservative', 4 and challenged many ideas that dominated twentieth century tort law thinking.
Allan Beever has been part of this chorus of nostalgics for quite some time. In a book published in 2007 he told his readers that the present problem with the law of negligence is that its 'unity . . . has been forgotten' and that we therefore have to 'rediscover' it. 5 In his new book, he extends his argument in two ways:
First, it is not just the unity of negligence law that's been forgotten, but that of the entire private law; and it is not just the law that has been forgotten, but the entire form of justice that underlies it. We have come to think of the world exclusively through the lens of distributive justice, so that we no longer see that private law embodies a distinct form of justice, commutative justice. (Beever prefers 'commutative' to 'corrective' justice to highlight the fact that it is concerned not just with responses to wrongs, but with all interpersonal relations.)
The source of all this is a philosophical confusion: the 'traditional' view he favours sees law (ie the natural law that exists pre-politically and that governs interpersonal relationship) as the foundation of political authority; the prevalent modern view reverses the relationship and sees all law as the product of politics (6) .
This may seem like a rather abstruse debate but Beever thinks it has significant real-world ramifications: 'the modern conception leads us to misunderstand our law' (273), it made us forget 'what we ourselves know' to be true (242); it has even 'distorted our view of ourselves' (309). As an aid to failing memory, the book presents a historical account that seeks to chart the path that has led to our present unhappy state. Beever takes his readers on a tour through the works of some of the best known names in the history of Western philosophy with the aim of demonstrating how what 'we' once knew has become unknown. The story follows the familiar arc of rise and fall, with the traditional view getting its first articulation in ancient Athens, developing slowly until it reaches its apex in the work of Immanuel Kant. By then, however, the forces of decline have already begun to wreak havoc, and by the time we get to the present the modern view 'has become unconscious' (2); so unconscious that Beever does not expect the traditional view to 'make much sense to the reader, at least not until she has finished reading [the] book' (1). Nevertheless, it is an effort worth making, because the stakes could not be higher. The dominance of the modern view is not just of theoretical concern, it has had a terrible practical effect on our lives:
it has led us to rely on the state to such a degree that we may soon unwittingly be descending towards totalitarianism (291), caring too much about the community and not enough about individuals and 'overemphasiz[ing] the importance of the state' (309).
These are very bold claims, but as I hope to show Beever does not provide anything remotely sufficient to substantiate them. The following three sections provide some of evidence to challenge Beever's claims. The next section then shows the weakness of Beever's more theoretical claims. The final section argues that contrary to Beever's claims that the traditional view provides a non-political foundation for private law, Beever's views have a clear political orientation.
THE FORGETTING THESIS
Beever's main thesis is that there are two distinct forms of justicecommutative and distributive -and that we have forgotten about commutative justice, the form of justice that governs our interpersonal relationships. Consequently, we see all law from the perspective of distributive justice, the form of justice that governs our relation to the state. As a result 'we do not understand the most basic features of our political or legal obligations to one another' (1) . Furthermore, this perspective is 'by far the most fundamental' (2) because it is only through these interpersonal relationship that states, politics, and distributive justice become possible. The heart of the problem is that contemporary writers on 'social, political, or legal philosophy' are 'all but exclusively concerned with the state' (1) . What is missing is the perspective that involves people in relation to each other, regardless of the state. Much of the book then
proceeds to contrast what Beever believes is the correct but forgotten 'traditional view' with the prevailing but deeply flawed 'modern view'. I will call this 'the forgetting thesis'.
Part of the difficulty in evaluating the forgetting thesis is that it is so fuzzily articulated. We are told that it is 'we' who have forgotten about commutative justice, but it is never made clear who 'we' are. Sometimes it seems that it is all of us who have forgotten it, so that '[w]hen we talk of public discourse, we talk almost as if we were creatures who relate to other individuals only via the state and its concerns' (309). At other times, it seems that while 'we' the people actually still 'think in terms [of the traditional view] routinely' (241), 'we' the philosophers and academic lawyers have come to think in the wrong way (14-29, 255-257, 173, 276) . However, even this claim is qualified when Beever admits that the view has not been 'entirely forgotten' and then provides a long list (that could have been much longer) of prominent scholars who still follow the traditional view (8) .
At times Beever says that merely presenting his readers with 'the political world through the eyes of the traditional theorists . . . is no small task' because ' [t]he modern view places a veil over all our thought that is very hard to lift' (6) . Yet at other times Beever is confident that his readers will find ideas he associates with the modern view unintuitive (231) and even 'too implausible to be taken seriously' (4, n 3). There are times when we are told that 'the fundamental structure of the private law remains based on commutative justice' (273), but elsewhere we are told that the single-minded pursuit of the impartiality of commutative justice 'is what the common law looked like'
once, but that 'it does not look like that now' (306). In some places 'casual' reflection directs us immediately to the 'obvious' traditional analysis (252), while at other times, we are told that the 'language of the street', presumably the casual language of the layperson, 'is the language of the modern conception' (246, 252).
Even ignoring these ambiguities, can we say that anything like the forgetting thesis is true? The answer is unequivocally negative; in fact, as a historical matter quite the opposite is the case. Underlying Beever's thinking is a view that 'insists on treating individuals as such rather than merely as elements in the collective', 6 and he sees the modern view, because it obliterates interpersonal relationships, as of a piece with this collectivist approach. As it happens, historical and anthropological research strongly suggest that this individualistic ethical stance is a relative historical novelty that appeared in the world of ideas at the same historical period Beever associates with the rise of the modern view. 7 In historical terms, then, Beever gets things exactly backwards.
When turning from history to contemporary reality, the view that individuals have certain obligations to each other regardless of politics or citizenship is utterly familiar. We live in a world saturated with social norms that no-one thinks of as related to the state: they range from relatively trivial matters like dress codes or the appropriate manner of addressing strangers, through matters that are on the borderline of morality like the appropriate way to behave towards one's neighbours or in a foreign country, to outright moral questions like the obligations we have towards the elderly, friends, the care for one's family and relatives and so on. It would also be wrong to think that these views are If what has been forgotten is some version of natural law, then the forgotten thesis is false. A quick and unscientific search for English-language books with the term 'natural law' in their title published since the year 2000 returned dozens of such books. 9 This is not to say that natural law theories have not changed through the ages or that there are no important differences among them. The point is that at the level of abstraction at which Beever addresses these issues, the ideas he talks about are a familiar part of the discourse.
The picture does not change when we consider Beever's more specific theses.
Beever's main claim in political philosophy is that (natural law) norms of interpersonal relations are the basis for politics; his main thesis in legal theory is that these pre-political norms form the foundations of private law. Beever presents the first thesis as something that most of his readers will find utterly baffling, indeed barely comprehensible. As we have all been looking at the world Because Beever is not alone among contemporary traditionalists in ignoring this broader historical context, it is worth relaying it in slightly greater detail. In the supposed glory days of respect for interpersonal relationships, when the state and distributive justice were (at best) only a remote presence in most people's lives, what one finds is not so much respect for interpersonal relationships, but levels of interpersonal violence dramatically higher than those found in developed countries today. To this day, non-state societies have average homicide rates that are orders of magnitude higher than those found in state societies; and the same is true of Western societies in the pre-modern age. For instance, the homicide rate in fourteenth century Oxford was more than a hundred times higher than the homicide rate in contemporary London.
today's western countries, where the state is most prominent, womenmore than half the world's population -enjoy more 'interpersonal independence' (292) than they have had at any point in recorded history. 20 Many attribute these dramatic changes, at least in part, to the rise of the modern state. 21 Though it is difficult to be certain about causality on such matters, at the very least the data suggest that individuals' concern for interpersonal relations alone may not be powerful enough to guarantee people's safety from others. They also undermine the suggestion that because of an ever-present Leviathan we have collectively forgotten about interpersonal relations.
It is also worth remembering that although the state is in some respects a more prominent feature in our lives these days, it is much less so in others. Jeremy
Bentham, a modernist according to Beever, was among the first to call for decriminalising sexual 'irregularities' in the name 'all comprehensive freedom'.
Immanuel Kant, probably Beever's foremost traditionalist, believed that it is the state's business to punish these violations of natural law. 22 Here is what Bentham had to say of the idea of criminalising certain sexual practices: 'If there is one idea more ridiculous than another, it is that of a legislator who, when a man and a woman are agreed about a business of this sort, thrusts himself in between them, examining situations, regulating times and prescribing modes and postures'. 23 Beever's account makes it hard to understand why such words sound so obvious to modern ears.
The history of scientific and technological development is also forgotten in the works of the nostalgics. Beever manages to write a book tracking the historical development of contemporary ideas on private law without mentioning the fact that these days (but not in the days of Locke or Kant) most adults in many parts of the world are in charge of machines that can cause death or serious injury to others, not because of forgetfulness of the importance of interpersonal relationship, but due to a moment's carelessness. Those who lament the supposedly skewed contemporary vision of tort law as 'accidentlaw-plus', 24 forget that it reflects modern-day reality: much less interpersonal violence than in the olden days of assault and battery, but many more accidents.
Even limiting ourselves to the world of ideas, Beever forgets that we live in the world of risk and probability, theoretical concepts largely unknown before the eighteenth century, but now so prevalent we no longer notice their ubiquity.
The development of notions of risk is not just the product of mathematical advances, but also due to the wealth of statistical data that makes risk assessments possible. (The word 'statistics' bears witness to this science's historical connection to the rise of the state.) The methodical collection of such data, though it had some predecessors, began in earnest only in the nineteenth century. 25 Consequently, in its modern sense 'risk', contrary to Cardozo's famous words in
Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad, is not 'a term of relation' 26 but one of pooling different people (and events) together.
As none of this makes it to Beever's story, we are left puzzled when we read that the traditional view declined 'after the convulsion set off by Hobbes and the English Civil War' (6), especially as Beever himself says that this 'decline was not the result of a confrontation between the traditional and the modern view won by the latter', but rather the result of a ' "paradigm shift" in the way that people thought about politics' (6). Thomas Kuhn, who coined the term, argued that paradigm shifts occur when there is an accumulation of empirical findings that cannot not be explained within an existing scientific paradigm. 27 Obviously, by That is what it means for corrective justice to be a form of justice' (73). The context leaves no doubt that Beever shares this view.
This passage raises an intriguing question that Beever never carefully addresses, which touches on the relationship between commutative and distributive justice.
This may seem like a borderline question that need not affect the 'internal' analysis of the 'nature' of commutative justice, but as I hope to show it is central to the evaluation of Beever's position. One possible way of understanding the relationship between commutative and distributive justice is that they occupy (to borrow a phrase from Stephen Jay Gould) two 'non-overlapping magisteria'.
We can classify events in the world as belonging exclusively to commutative justice or to distributive justice (and probably some that fit neither), but no event raises questions for both. It follows from this view that there can be no conflicts between commutative and distributive justice. (There is, I think, some reason to think that this is how Aristotle understood the relationship between the two, but I will say nothing here to substantiate this claim.)
In some instances it looks as though Beever believes that this is the correct view.
For example, it fits his view that limits distributive justice to redistribution (279).
In a different (and perhaps inconsistent) formulation he says that an act constitutes 'distributive injustice only if the reason it is wrongful is that it results in an unfair distribution of benefits and burdens amongst the community' (107-108, also 137, all they amount to is that such considerations do not 'belong' in tort law (which 'genuinely' is exclusively about commutative justice). In response we could just say that tort law events require courts to take into account commutative justice considerations (as found in tort law, strictly so-called) alongside distributive ones.
The institutional argument
All this shows the pointlessness of trying to win normative debates by appeal to conceptual analysis. Sensing perhaps the weakness of these conceptual arguments, Beever bolsters his normative conclusions with arguments relying on the institutional limits of courts and their lack of legitimacy to decide political questions. So understood, there is nothing in any event that forecloses taking distributive considerations into account, but there are constraints on the body that decides such cases, that limit the sort of considerations it should rely on.
Unlike the conceptual arguments, these are valid concerns, but they need to be considered carefully. One reason to doubt such arguments is that they prove too much. If such arguments were convincing, they would require a significant change in the way courts have operated for several decades now in the domain of public law. Even if Beever is interested only in private law, it is surprising, to say the least, that he does not acknowledge the full scope of his arguments and the extent to which they would require not just some rethinking in private law, but also rolling back decades of public law developments as well. Simply as a matter of sheer numbers, if it is institutional capacity and political legitimacy he is concerned about, the role courts often play in constitutional litigation should have worried him much more. 32 Beever might reply that he is happy (or sad) to report that in his view much of public law adjudication is politically illegitimate but that, unlike the lost cause that is public law, in private law there may still be hope in returning the law to its proper, traditional, origins. But even within the domain of private law, it is unclear whether courts could satisfy his strictures. Beever's argument, a familiar point in the work of tort law nostalgics, is that when the court decides an issue according to commutative justice 'it is able to determine how the gap should be filled by considering justice as between the parties', hence 'its law-making need not be political' (302). Notice first how Beever changes his analysis to fit his Beever concedes that there may be disagreements on questions of private law (302) but denies that this fact undermines judges' capacity to decide them (304).
But why should such matters be handed to judges even if they may be publicly controversial? Beever's answer is that 'judges have superior expertise with respect to commutative justice' (306). In other words, he thinks that the last of the three characteristics identified above for institutionally problematic decisions does not obtain. But judges' expertise on commutative justice is an empirical claim for which he gives no evidence, and it is unclear what would make them such experts. It is not as if there is some sort of certification or specialisation that can show one to be an expert on commutative justice in the way one can be shown to be an expert on the rules of contract law, and to argue that judges' expertise in contract law makes them experts in commutative justice is precisely what
Beever needs to show. It cannot simply be the fact that because judges are required to think about commutative justice they have developed expertise on the subject, for if that were the case, we could just expose judges to the broader range of issues required to make good decisions on distributive justice and thus make them experts on political questions. In fact, if constant exposure to a question is sufficient for such expertise, arguably contemporary judges could claim expertise in distributive justice already since public law litigation constantly exposes them to it. Even if it can be shown that judges are experts on commutative justice because legal doctrine embodies it, that would just beg the question why doctrine should match commutative justice (and not something else). Since it is possible to decide such questions on other grounds, if most members of a community prefer a different legal rule which they justify on (say) distributive justice grounds, why should they not get to enact it?
Finally, if Beever's forgetting thesis is correct, we should be sceptical of the alleged judicial expertise on questions of commutative justice. After all, it is the judges who have been encumbered by politics in the domain of public law and who have often blurred the boundaries between the two; it is the judges who read those academic articles peddling the modern ideas. The people, by contrast, are according to Beever himself, less exposed to such dangerous nonsense, and so (either directly or through their elected representatives)
should be given to decide these matters.
This shows that even if we accept Beever's argument wholesale, all that follows is that judges should decide cases on commutative justice grounds if we wish to have such cases decided on non-political grounds. Society could prefer to have such cases decided politically and designate it to a non-judicial body that would be empowered to decide such cases on distributive grounds. Beever does not directly address this question but some remarks he makes reveal his attitude to such suggestions. One option is to turn these matters over to the legislature which (if functioning properly) avoids both the problem of legitimacy and the problem of lack of institutional capacity. Nevertheless, Beever believes that when the legislature intervenes in the domain of private law, its role should be limited to 'remov[ing] obstacles to the achievement of commutative justice'
(306). This view does not follow from anything Beever has argued for. One may accept that there are some pre-political natural law norms; one may even grant that some such norms are necessary for establishing a political community so that in some sense some law is prior to politics. It does not follow that after the polity's establishment, it should simply try to enforce these pre-political norms to govern the interpersonal relationships that exist within a political community. The legislature may choose to do that, but it may equally decide to replace them with others. To deny this is tantamount to the claim that there are substantive limits on the law-making powers not just of courts, but also of legislatures, which go beyond anything that may be written in any constitution. (This implies that according to Beever himself, courts and legislatures lack political authority in this field: 215, cf 178.) But nothing, either in the conceptual 'nature' of private law, or in the traditional view's priority of law over politics warrants this conclusion.
Once we abandon the non-overlapping magisteria view, distributive justice considerations do not miraculously lose their validity in the context of a commutative justice event, and a legislature may enact laws that reflect that. The practical effect of Beever's view is that certain events will be decided on the basis of commutative justice alone. Beever seems to think that this follows from the fact that courts are institutionally-constrained, but in fact in such cases we face a choice. If we are convinced that certain events raise both commutative and distributive justice considerations (which seems to be Beever's view) and that judges are institutionally incapable of deciding such matters taking into account all the relevant considerations, then the institutional question is this: should we leave the decision to a body that is not going to take all relevant considerations into account (thus more-or-less guaranteeing its decisions will be all-thingsconsidered wrong), or should we remove the decision from that body and giving it to a different one that can take all considerations into account. There is no obvious answer to this question, for the benefits from awarding the decision to bodies that decide on narrower grounds (simplicity, fewer controversies) may outweigh the benefits from deciding based on all the relevant considerations. But such a question, if taken seriously, requires careful consideration. The view that it would always be better to give decision-making power on such matters to the more institutionally-constrained body without any argument seems motivated by different concerns, political ones. As I will argue below, Beever's book reveals his political preferences, and the priority he gives to commutative justice in cases of conflict matches those preferences. Recognition of the conceptual possibility of a form of regulation more private than the one Beever discusses also makes it easier to understand why, when the state is involved, there is no basis for limiting a priori the kind of considerations it can bring to bear in adjudication. Those who manage their affairs on their own can decide on whatever rules fit their fancy; when the state is involved by providing a set of enforceable rules (ie, when the state mobilises its power to guarantee others' compliance), it provides a service needed precisely by those who worry that the truly private form of private law would not suffice. Two points follow: first, there is nothing odd about the idea that on this view 'contract law is seen as an imposition on freedom rather than the realisation thereof' (270), for that is precisely what contract law is for: it is an institution that brings in a third party -the state -to compel (or guarantee or signal) compliance. 35 As such, contract law can be seen as an imposition on freedom for the sake of the (greater) freedom made possible by contracting.
Second, and more important, because positive private law is a state-provided service, the state is entitled to provide it on its own terms, which may include (amongst other things) taking societal or distributive considerations into account. That is exactly what the state does when, as a matter of unquestionable legal doctrine, it refuses to provide its assistance to the enforcement of certain contracts that are unimpeachable from a purely commutative perspective.
Those unhappy with this service, can (and do) resort to other, more private means of enforcement: Knowing that the state will not provide its enforcement-services for his agreements is why the contract killer relies on other means for making sure he is paid.
BEEVER'S POLITICS
Beever's arguments fail as an attempt at 'understanding' the law and politics of our times, because he ignores almost everything that is relevant for understanding them. What he is unhappy about is not the prevalence of an 'idea' (2), it is the reality built on the foundations of this idea. If we are to make sense of the book, it is not as an attempt at understanding, but as a work of political advocacy. This seems to be a latent theme in the book (eg, 104) mostly hidden under a veneer of conceptual analysis. It is only in the final pages of the book, as though Beever could no longer contain himself, that his politics become explicit. Beever suggests that the modern view leads to totalitarianism (289-291). To demonstrate just how far we have already gone down that road, in an essay published shortly before Forgotten Justice and which can be read as a précis for it, Beever has noted that ours is the age of 'human resources' as proof of the manner in which the modern view has made us treat our fellow humans. 36 In that essay Beever candidly said he hoped his ideas would be 'politically transformative' 37 and for that end in Forgotten Justice he quotes from Joseph Goebbels and from Che Guevara (290-291, 308-309) as warning signs for where we are headed, the impending eradication of the individual under the crushing yoke of an allconsuming state. 38 It is not just the future, though: already 'our forgetting of commutative justice' has 'led us to ignore the importance of interpersonal freedom, to overplay the needs of the community vis-à-vis the autonomy of the individual, and to overemphasize the importance of the state and overestimate its ability to facilitate justice' (309). In the same vein, in the earlier essay Beever also said that '[h]uman rights law is the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff. We need it in part because the fence at the top, constructed in no small part by the private law, has been torn down. But it is worse than this, as that law now encourages people to fall down'.
39
Though Beever seeks to present these concerns as ones shared by many on the left and the right (309), Beever's politics are difficult to mistake -the desire to protect the individual from the overpowering collective; the belief that the foundations of political community are based on natural law; the view that private law should largely reflect those natural laws; the view that respect for 'traditional' private law is necessary (and perhaps sufficient) for a wellfunctioning society; the narrow and inegalitarian understanding of distributive justice; the concern that modern private law has been infiltrated by 'alien' public concerns, which in turn is but one manifestation of a more general encroachment of our freedoms by the state; the claim that people tend to over-rely on the state; the insinuation that seemingly innocuous Western welfare states already take us down the road to serfdom; even an opposition to the idea that people have any moral duty to rescue strangers 40 -these are all familiar libertarian themes. 41 Beever is entitled to his political opinions, but it would take a very different book from the one he has written to try to persuade those who do not share his views to adopt them. Since Beever does not argue for these views, I will not discuss here the merits or demerits of libertarianism. Absent a political argument, one would have expected at least some empirical evidence to support his prophecies of imminent doom. There are lots of sheep in New Zealand, but not, to my knowledge, any evidence that New Zealanders have become more sheep-like in their blind adherence to government or that they have forgotten their interpersonal relationships since they adopted their social accident compensation scheme. The US provides another example. Beever mentions it as a country where the distinction between public law and private law is not dominant (170), and with private law more politicised than elsewhere (251). 42 On his analysis that must mean that the US is further down the totalitarian road than the rest of the common law world. There is, as far as I can tell, no evidence to support that.
The most comprehensive challenge to Beever's claims comes from the statistics mentioned earlier on the decline in human violence in exactly those times and places in which the state has been an active presence, a decline made all the more remarkable by the fact that population density is much higher now than in the past. The data themselves are overwhelming and difficult to dispute, but unless shown to be wrong, Beever would have to challenge the causal connection between the rise of the state and the decline of interpersonal violence. Doing so would present Beever with a dilemma: if the decline in violence can be attributed, even in part, to the state, then he is wrong to say that people 'overemphasize the state and overestimate its ability to facilitate justice' (309); quite the contrary, most people, perhaps because they are unfamiliar with the alternative, do not appreciate just how much the state is responsible for their peaceful lives. If on the other hand this decline has nothing to do with the state, then the most likely explanation is a major improvement in humans' concern for interpersonal relationships, which would suggest his worries are unfounded.
CONCLUSION
It is sometimes useful to take a step back from a theory, not just to point out its logical inconsistencies, hidden assumptions, or unwarranted conclusions, but in order to consider its overall message. Sometimes this more panoramic view can reveal what closer inspection misses out. When one does that, one of the striking features of Beever's position is just how strange it is. This is perhaps clearest in the position he takes towards the place of consequences. In contemporary moral philosophy a view is usually classified as non-consequentialist when its proponents think that consequences are not the only thing that matters, that sometimes other, 'deontological', considerations (sometimes called sideconstraints) override concern for consequences. What is remarkable about Beever's approach (along with that of other private law nostalgics) is that he thinks that in the domain of private law consequences never matter, that it is never right for humans to choose certain rules over others because they will improve their lot. Contrary to Beever's claim that this is the 'traditional' view that all philosophers used to accept and that this is the view that most people intuitively accept, this extreme view has very few adherents. 
